In the public administration environment, decisions related to retirement and referrals are often read from a narrow financial or emotionally social perspective, but a deep reading necessitates examining the impact of these decisions on the dynamics of the institution and its ability to innovate. The retreat from the mandatory retirement of someone who has spent thirty years in public service is not just an administrative measure, but a decision that fundamentally affects the knowledge accumulation structure, leadership flow, and the state's ability to keep up with the accelerated transformations in modern work models.
Public institutions are conservative by nature and tend to favor stability over change. When natural exit channels for expertise that has exhausted its productive cycle are blocked, we practically create a situation of "job congestion." Thirty years in public service is not just a number; it is a full-time cycle during which convictions, work patterns, and an organizational culture belonging to a specific era were formed, and the continuation of these patterns in decision-making or influential positions limits the emergence of new thought patterns suited for the requirements of digital governance and institutional flexibility.
The issue here is not age as a biological datum, but the pattern as an administrative datum; prolonged tenure in service without renewal pathways creates a layer of the old guard who sees change as a threat to their procedural stability, turning the institution into a structure that defends its survival rather than defending its strategic goals.
Administratively; the vitality of any administrative system depends on clear pathways for replacement and succession, and here lies the problem with retreating from mandatory retirement for those who have completed thirty years, as an ethical choice that ensures their income source isn't cut off, highlighting the importance of leaving the choice to them, either by moving to another position or accepting the retirement referral with the possibility of stopping retirement and returning to work if another opportunity arises, thus ensuring the interests of not depleting social security resources, and not obstructing the "administrative elevator," where leadership and supervisory positions remain occupied for periods that exceed the institutional service lifespan. Such congestion not only deprives young and middle-aged talents of leadership opportunities, but it also leads to a situation of "job alienation" for the new generations who see that the ceiling of their ambition is governed by structural rigidity, not performance efficiency.
Moreover, the gap between modern work tools (based on data, artificial intelligence, and agility) and the mentality formed in a traditional bureaucratic environment three decades ago creates a state of inconsistency in public performance. An institution that does not renew its leadership's blood gradually loses its ability to comprehend the language of the era, and it turns into isolated islands of rigid bureaucracy.
In the philosophy of public administration we aspire for, remaining in a position should be linked to the ability to deliver "public value" added, not merely by continuing in the position. Granting the option of continuation for those who have spent thirty years without strict performance criteria turns the public service from a mandate with specific tasks into an acquired right, weakening the essence of accountability. Often; when the clear time standard for referral is absent, personal and discretionary factors intervene in the decision to stay or leave, opening the door to policies of appeasement and administrative nepotism.
Jurisprudentially, the strength of the legislation lies in its abstraction, and by maintaining the mandatory referral to retirement represents a self-modernizing tool for the institution, ensuring a dignified exit for expertise and a smooth entry for fresh blood within a clear legal framework that does not succumb to whims.
Finally, the question that imposes itself today is not just about the individual rights of the employee, but about the state's right to have a flexible and competitive administrative apparatus. Do we have the luxury of sacrificing the competitiveness of our institutions in favor of maintaining fragile administrative stability? And we must realize that institutional stagnation is the hidden cost that states pay when they prefer immediate solutions at the expense of the strategic vision for developing the public sector. And the bet is always on our ability to design legislations that balance between valuing expertise and the necessity of change, with the realization that an institution that does not breathe through generational exchange is doomed to bureaucratic bloating and suffocation.
