Khaberni -100 years ago, Sultan Pasha al-Atrash uttered his decisive statement:
(Our religion and nationality are twins that cannot be separated, for we are Muslims by faith, Arabs by homeland, Syrians by belonging).
These words were not just a national statement, but a covenant establishing the foundation of identity. He was not addressing a sect, but a nation, and he was not establishing a leadership, but a memory that resists marginalization and oblivion.
Today, as we are on the threshold of the centenary of the Great Syrian Revolution, this memory is being whipped anew, not in a battlefield, but in a carefully studied and planned scene in the heart of Sweida. The image was publicly insulted, in an attempt to dismantle a collective legacy, in a scene carefully designed to break symbolism before geography.
Since the establishment of the Zionist entity, Israel has not only viewed Syria as a classical enemy, but as a mosaic prone to internal explosion, through sects, through minorities, through symbols. The Druze page has always been a pivotal target in this endeavor, in southern Syria, where geography still witnesses the stubbornness of history, intersecting the interests of states and projects of division and internationalization on the slopes of Jabal al-Arab. There, where people used to protect themselves without an army, and lead their revolutions without guardianship, Sweida has returned to headline a bloody scene that reads only one question,
Why now? And why specifically the Druze component?
What we witness in Sweida is not an isolated incident, nor a chaotic internal conflict, but the first link in a chain of geopolitical arrangements, starting from southern Syria and possibly not ending until the gates of Damascus. Israel is now moving according to a comprehensive strategic vision, likely established during the recent closed meetings between Netanyahu and Trump, where indicators point to an unannounced American green light to reproduce Israel's regional expansionist role, not through direct occupation but through soft penetration and imposing sectarian protection.
The Druze arena will gradually transform into local forces pushed to take up arms under the guise of self-defense, then functionally linked to Israel, before being used as a pressure card on Damascus and the surrounding Arab and international environment. Israel does not aim to protect anyone, but to explode the Syrian interior by planting sectarian entities that ensure it controls its border depth and prevents the return of the centralized state which has become ambiguous.
In this context, the Druze are being re-showcased in the media as victims threatened with genocide, justifying an Israeli protective intervention under the pretext of ancient ties since the Israeli army includes a significant number of them, thereby granting Tel Aviv a moral rhetorical platform in the West, legitimizing its role in Syria as it did in Lebanon in the eighties.
And what happened from Israeli bombing of southern Syria, followed by a quick withdrawal of forces (Al-Shar'/Al-Golani), is just the beginning of a comprehensive scenario, pushing Sweida to explode, then signaling (rescue) by whom? (Israel), leading to an implicit international mandate to form a new reality on the ground.
The most dangerous aspect of this project is not the apparent Israeli penetration, but the redefinition of the entire Druze component as a community exploitable outside the Syrian national identity. From different sides, this description produces a bitter internal division, between those who see Israel as a temporary salvation, and those who realize that it digs the grave of the nation. And if this division succeeds, it will pave the way for a phase (decentralized Damascus), where the capital is politically isolated and geographically besieged from the south, east, north, and inside.
The final goal is not just Sweida, but Syria as a state and identity. What happens in the negotiations held behind closed doors in Tel Aviv, Washington, or some Arab capitals, feeds into a strategy to dismantle the Syrian state into sectarian cantons, paving the way for a new Middle East with no balance except for Israel. The south is just the beginning, but not the end.
And the most important vulnerability, Damascus’s suffering from a strategic dilemma, as it will not invade Sweida, with the absence of control and seeming incapable of protecting the unity of the country. This void is currently filled with rhetoric and calls for forming a "unified" Druze army, also used to re-engineer the position of the sect in the Syrian scene, outside the national umbrella.
What is happening in Jabal al-Arab today is not a power struggle, but a pivotal battle over Syria's identity itself - will it remain a unifying homeland, or transform into a mosaic of conflicting identities, each seeking protection from abroad? And who secures this abroad and its interests.
Israel knows perfectly well that the gate to Damascus does not open from the Golan, but from Sweida. Breaking this mountain can enable it to besiege the capital, not just militarily, but morally and politically. Thus, the Druze page is not just a minority file, but a strategic assault tool on a complete regional system.
Conversely, what role does Iran have here? Can Tehran intervene in the developments of Sweida through indirect tools that keep its moves below the confrontation threshold with Israel?? Do these tools start by mobilizing its loyal networks around Sweida to disrupt any new foreign positioning and prevent the formation of a functionally separate entity? Or does it push towards arming opposing Druze groups loyal to the Iranian axis under the banner (self-defense), to mix the internal cards and prevent the Druze component from aligning clearly with Israel?? Or does Tehran employ media and religious rhetoric that presents the Israeli project as an existential threat to minorities, legitimizing its intervention as (a guarantor of sectarian balance)? Under this rhetoric, does it activate its influence in Damascus to push the regime towards political maneuvers in the south, without sliding into an overt clash?? And could (Al-Shar'/Al-Golani) be a hidden target for neutralization, giving Tehran an additional justification for its intervention, and a catalyst for its measured movement, in a finely balanced battle managed without direct confrontation.
Finally, at this moment, there is no bigger enemy than negligence, and no deeper betrayal than blending with the illusion (of Zionist rescue). Sweida does not need Israeli protection, but the restoration of its national decision. Either the mountain remains a mountain, or it is reduced to a platform for a new occupation, raising its flag this time not atop tanks, but in the hearts of those who have lost their compass.
