Khaberni - With Washington extending the truce indefinitely, and Tehran refusing to engage in any political talks, questions escalate about the path the upcoming confrontation will take between the two parties.
While the United States is betting on continuing economic and military pressure to weaken the Iranian regime, Iran appears steadfast in its refusal, relying on its internal resilience and finding new leverage in the Strait of Hormuz.
This scene opens the door to a more complex phase in the current war between America, the Zionist entity, and Iran, as regional and international calculations intertwine, and the region faces open possibilities between military escalation or seeking a political settlement.
"The American Alternative Plan"
Commenting on this, Dr. Badr Al-Madi, Professor of Political Sociology at the German Jordanian University, said that the failure of the talks to convene as planned was a surprise, notably since the need for them, specifically from the Iranian side, is highly sensitive and crucial to end this file.
The essence of the answer to the question "Where are things heading?" lies in each party's recognition of the interests it can gain from continuing the war, or from signing a truce or peace agreement between the two parties. He confirmed that the United States has come to the conviction after everything that has occurred, that Iran is not ready to accept what Washington proposes in terms of conditions.
However, this Iranian refusal does not necessarily mean a return to war, instead, it opens the door to another option represented by weakening the Iranian regime through what he described as "the hybrid project," which relies on continuous military operations coupled with a harsh economic blockade aiming to destabilize the internal structure of the Iranian regime and strip it of its survival and continuity tools.
Dr. Al-Madi added that this maritime and economic blockade would lead to the disruption of Iranian ports, deepening the financial crisis, in the absence of genuine opportunities for China or Russia to assist Tehran. Despite the negative repercussions this would have on the global economy, especially on China, American assessments indicate that weakening the Iranian regime through this course would not take long years, but rather a limited period amidst the internal unrest Iranians are experiencing.
Dr. Al-Madi pointed out that Iranians are well aware that Washington is pushing them towards a dangerous brink, a brink the regime does not wish to reach, established over 47 years within a solid religious ideological framework that penetrated the Arab world, invested in the Palestinian cause, and regional stability to bolster its position, as well as strengthened its power within the state at the expense of its institutions. He indicated that any concession made by the regime to the United States would be interpreted domestically as weakness, potentially leading to the collapse of its popular base.
Dr. Al-Madi stressed that Iran would not easily accept what Washington wants, even with pressures from intermediaries and friends, which might push the regime towards a path akin to "political suicide," through rejecting American conditions, resulting in a high price to be paid by both the regime and the Iranian people alike, leaving Iranian society vulnerable to deep political, economic, social, and demographic disturbances.
3 Possible Scenarios for the Crisis
The president of the Jordanian Association for Political Science, Dr. Khaled Shuneikat, stated that the current scene could be interpreted through 3 scenarios, the first being the continuation of the current situation, a state of "neither war nor peace," with no agreement or comprehensive confrontation. He confirmed that this option is linked to the United States' inability to wage a direct war against Iran due to high risks and weak domestic support, where the popularity of President Donald Trump does not exceed 36%, besides the uncertain results of the war.
Dr. Shuneikat explained that continuing the current situation remains the most likely option, with the possibility of military mobilization and stockpiling of weapons in preparation for a shift to another choice. He added that the most prominent features of this scenario focus on the continuation of the tight American blockade on Iran, which could eventually push Iran to make concessions. However, this blockade also reflects negatively on the global economy, especially in the event of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, prompting Washington's allies, whether in the Gulf, Europe, or East Asia, to exert pressure on the American administration to seek solutions, due to the threat it poses to energy supplies.
He clarified that this course depends on "stamina," where the deadly blockade could lead to Iran's surrender, but it remains subject to essential variables, the most significant being the Chinese stance that may become clear during Trump's visit to the Chinese capital, Beijing, where the issue of Taiwan might be included in the details of a potential deal. He noted that China, which imports 90% of Iranian oil, may refuse to comply with the embargo imposed on Tehran, a factor of great importance in determining the course of the crisis.
The second scenario is that the significant and ongoing blockade could push Iran towards concessions, especially if internal economic and social pressures increase. He emphasized that this likelihood remains complicated given Iran's firm stance and refusal to comply with American conditions.
He mentioned that the third scenario entails reaching a settlement, possibly including concessions from either side or both, in an effort to find middle ground solutions that preserve their interests and spare the region an open confrontation. He affirmed that the military option remains restricted by internal and external factors, but he noted that the Zionist entity clearly supports this choice, and if it were up to it, the war would not have stopped at all but would have continued to the end, adding additional danger to the scenario.
Extension of the Truce Confuses Iran's Calculations
For his part, security and strategic expert Dr. Omar Al-Raddad said that Trump's decision to extend the ceasefire indefinitely raises questions about his bets and choices. He pointed out that this decision is based on several pillars: the first is to politically transfer the battle to the Iranian interior, where disputes would escalate between the Revolutionary Guard on one hand and the reformists on the other, and perhaps the conflict would extend to include the Iranian people themselves.
The second of these pillars is to maintain the blockade imposed on Iranian ports, which deepens the financial crisis of the Revolutionary Guard and opens the opportunity for them to attack commercial ships, which in turn has prompted NATO countries and regional forces to directly confront the Revolutionary Guard to protect their maritime interests.
Dr. Al-Raddad added that the open-ended extension alleviates the criticisms directed at Trump regarding the management of the war in the United States, and it also breaks the Revolutionary Guard's bets on Washington being time-pressed, confirming that he is "not in a hurry." He noted that the United States does not suffer from economic pressures due to the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz or the energy crisis; on the contrary, it is the most benefited country from oil and gas trade at this stage.
Dr. Al-Raddad emphasized that Tehran's options appear limited under this extension except for resorting to military options in the Strait of Hormuz, which might achieve immediate gains for it, but at the same time, it would increase its losses and multiply its number of opponents.
