The Moroccan Sahara file returns to be activated at the Security Council level this month, through two important meetings: one to follow the movements of the UN envoy, and another for evaluating the work of the MINURSO mission. However, this movement does not come in a vacuum, but intersects with a tense regional context, especially with the repercussions of the war on Iran, which have begun to cast shadows on the region's balances.
In this context, the latest Washington Institute report, titled “Repercussions of the Iran War in North Africa,” offers a relatively different reading of the dossier, as it does not treat it as an isolated issue but links it to broader transformations in North Africa, especially concerning energy and the reordering of international priorities.
The report does not stop at describing the transformations, but also goes further in recommending Washington to continue supporting the diplomatic solution to the Sahara dossier, beyond traditional methods, with a "carrots and sticks" approach to push the diplomatic process forward, which forms the core of the American strategy towards the Moroccan Sahara dossier.
But what does this mix of "carrots and sticks" mean in practice? It appears that the United States is trying to make the political solution for the dossier both appealing and obligatory at the same time. The carrots come in the form of opportunities in energy, linking the Sahara to regional economic networks, and funding developmental projects making commitment to the solution profitable and tempting for everyone. The pressures, most likely, mean that any disruption or postponement of the settlement process after Security Council Resolution 2797 will not be without cost, as it results in a political and economic cost to the concerned parties, especially with Washington's direct monitoring of the recent negotiations based on Morocco's proposal for autonomy. Therefore, the political solution today is viewed not just as a legal or political option but is directly tied to economic and strategic regional interests.
The important idea here is that the dispute over the Sahara after the war will not just be a political dossier but will become linked to broader calculations related to energy and partnerships. The report sees that despite its costs, the crisis in the Middle East may open up opportunities for the region's countries to fill gaps in the energy markets, which places Morocco in a position to benefit, not just politically, but also economically, especially with recent support from the US administration for the dossier.
From the report's perspective, the war on Iran is a double-edged sword for North Africa: it threatens the stability of energy markets, but at the same time, it opens up uneven opportunities among the region's countries. For example, the report notes that Algeria and Libya have the potential to compensate for part of the shortage in energy supplies to Europe, but reality points to significant challenges; Algeria needs large investments in infrastructure to expand its production, while internal divisions in Libya hinder its ability to capitalize on rising oil prices.
Conversely, the report indicates that Morocco stands out among the region's countries with its ability to better capitalize on these transformations, particularly in the areas of renewable energy and fertilizers. It seems that the major projects in the southern provinces in recent years, such as the Dakhla Port and the Atlantic Coastal Initiative, and the Morocco-Nigeria gas pipeline, illustrate how Rabat links economic opportunities with political progress to support its proposal for autonomy in the Sahara.
More importantly, the report broadens the perspective on the Sahara dossier, so that it is no longer just a political dispute, but part of a regional equation linked to energy, investment, and security. Here, the idea of “carrots and sticks” takes on a deeper meaning; it goes beyond promoting negotiations to linking progress towards a solution with development opportunities. The incentives encourage investment, while the pressures impose a cost on any disruption, making the dossier closer to a logic of interests, and giving the southern provinces increased importance in energy projects and linking Africa to Europe.
Therefore, the timing of this proposition with Security Council meetings necessarily reflects a shift in the international approach to the dossier. The Sahara is no longer discussed only from the perspective of a political settlement but also from the angle of its role in global energy balances. In this context, the report focuses on the stability of North Africa as a whole, as a fundamental condition for benefiting from ongoing transformations. In other words, continued deadlock in the dossier limits the region's opportunities, while any political progress is linked to the potential to attract investments and develop energy projects.
In summary, the report presents a clear reading: the Sahara dossier is no longer isolated from major transformations, but has become part of a broader network of regional and international interests. The April sessions are no longer just a follow-up to the conflict, but an indicator of the start of a new approach, where the dossier is seen not only as a political issue but as an entry point to redraw the region's economic and strategic position, and to open the field for investment opportunities related to energy and stability. In short, the Sahara is no longer just a conflict but part of the new power equation in North Africa.
