Amid the controversy that accompanied the signing of the strategic partnership agreement to develop, manage, and operate the multipurpose port of Aqaba (the new port) between the Aqaba Development Corporation and Abu Dhabi Ports Group, and the questions and legitimate concerns it raised among a broad segment of the public opinion, I find myself compelled to provide a calm and realistic professional reading, far from general impressions and abbreviated headlines. A reading that stems from practical experience spanning approximately thirty-five years in the Jordanian ports sector, during which I held executive positions including the General Director of the Jordanian Ports Corporation, followed by the General Director of the Aqaba Ports Management and Operation Company for eight consecutive years, an experience that allowed me direct engagement with operational challenges and development pressures, regional competition, crisis management, as well as a deep understanding of the limits of the role the state can play individually in the face of accelerating geopolitical transformations in the region and keeping pace with the rapid changes in the global maritime transport and logistics industry.
This experience was further enhanced through my eight-year membership on the board of directors of the Arab Sea Ports Federation, and later, for about a year, as a consultant for Abu Dhabi Ports Group in its strategic projects within the Aqaba Special Economic Zone. This position provided me with close insight into the thinking patterns and methodologies of one of the largest port groups in the region, and direct knowledge of the level of seriousness and attention the management of the group accords to supporting Jordan and enhancing Aqaba’s position as a gateway and economic and logistical hub serving the region.
From this composite position – as a former official, professional, and someone acquainted with the logic of international partnerships – I see it necessary to distinguish between legitimate concerns about the state’s assets, which are understandable and respected, and the actual reality of what the agreement stipulates in terms of its scope, objectives, and economic and strategic dimensions.
It is important to clarify, accurately and objectively, that the multipurpose port referred to in this agreement is solely the new port, excluding other port facilities. The oil and liquefied gas port, the Middle Port area (Mutah and the Joint), passenger terminal docks, the customs center or the area designated for container inspection known as yard (4), and all other facilities are completely outside the scope of the agreement, remaining under the management and operation of the Aqaba Ports Management and Operation Company. This clarification is fundamental in correcting much of the confusion that accompanied the public discussion.
Herein, a set of facts and realities should be presented to the public, not as a defense or justification, but as a right to knowledge, since the absence of precise information or its fragmentation out of context leads to incorrect conclusions, distorts the overall view, and results in wrongs that may sometimes be unintended, and sometimes intentional for the purposes of sensationalism or show.
In this context, the agreement, unmistakably, does not include the sale of any state assets, nor does it touch upon national sovereignty, as all lands and assets will remain owned by the Jordanian government through the Aqaba Development Corporation. This is a sovereign red line that has not been crossed, constituting a legal basis that does not accept interpretation or bargaining, and confirms that what occurred is merely a management and operation partnership, no more, in a model employed in major global ports.
From a realistic professional angle, an understanding of the agreement is incomplete without mentioning a known fact to those in the sector, that the new port alone, in its current state, suffers from a financial imbalance as its revenues do not cover its operating and capital expenses. Thus, the partnership does not come to share existing profits, but to address an existing situation that requires direct capital investment, advanced operational expertise, and the ability to open new markets and attract different types of goods, gradually transforming this facility from a financial burden into a productive and sustainable asset.
In this regard, the agreement stipulates direct capital investment exceeding 130 million Jordanian Dinars, and cumulative returns expected to exceed 300 million Jordanian Dinars throughout the duration of the agreement. This should be viewed within a broader economic and investment equation aimed at maximizing the added value of existing assets, improving revenue sustainability, and enhancing performance efficiency in a sector that constitutes a main artery of the national economy.
On the operational level, the introduction of smart operating systems, enhanced operational planning, dock and yard management, reduced handling time, increased dock productivity, and the procurement of modern and safe handling machinery and equipment are not minor technical details but essential requirements for maintaining the competitiveness of the Aqaba port in a regional environment witnessing massive investments and rapid development in the ports sector. Moreover, attracting new types of goods and enhancing vehicle freight trade through Ro-Ro ships and project cargo has a positive reflection on reducing logistics costs for Jordanian importers and exporters.
It is essential to emphasize that public safety and safeguarding lives are fundamental pillars in port operations, and have always been part of the operational culture in Aqaba ports. However, the rapid evolution mContext: If the speaker is the one who "Khaberni", do not translate the word "Khaberni" Capsules of sizes, cargo types, operational intensity, and used technology in recent years have imposed higher and more complex safety and risk management requirements, which are enhanced by recent partnerships through advanced operating systems and national capacity development.
Equally important is the strategic dimension of the agreement, in terms of enhancing the efficiency of the transport and logistics services system, and raising the competitiveness of the Aqaba port as an active regional hub within global supply chains. This comes amid a regional environment experiencing acceleration in the development and introduction of new maritime facilities, rising levels of competition, and required operational efficiency, which makes updating operational capacities and expanding logistical options essential for maintaining Aqaba’s pivotal economic role.
The agreement also includes the development of the port infrastructure, maintenance of existing facilities, and the addition of the latest safe and intelligent handling equipment, alongside preparing the port to adapt to future transformations related to the green economy, energy, and sustainability, a strategic aspect that has become a crucial element in global port competitiveness today.
In conclusion, if this agreement is properly implemented, subject to clear governance and effective national oversight, it does not represent a concession on sovereignty, nor a sale of assets, but a well-considered use of partnership tools to enhance the competitive capacity of the Jordanian economy and transform operational challenges into real growth opportunities.
From a position of experience rather than complacency, I see that Aqaba deserves to be viewed with an eye to the future, not through the lens of fear, and that agreements should be judged by the balance of results, not by the scale of headlines, and by the logic of the highest national interest, not by general impressions.
