Eng. Moaz Al-Mubaideen
Each rainy season, the same scenes that have become a pressure on the public conscience in Jordan repeat themselves: flooded streets, and collapses in infrastructure that should have been designed to withstand decades. With each incident of flooding and floods, the traditional question arises about the quality of planning and the competence of the Jordanian engineer. However, a deep reading of the scene suggests that the problem is not in the engineering knowledge, but in the procedural integrity and in the gap between the written specification and the reality executed..
Jordan does not face a shortage of engineering competencies; the Jordanian engineer is one of the most prominent human exports in the region, and our engineering colleges possess a renowned legacy. Moreover, the technical specifications and standards adopted in our public tenders match the highest international standards. Therefore, we face a paradox involving excellent inputs (competencies and specifications) and faltering outputs. This discrepancy confirms that the defect lies in the transformation process; that is, in the implementation and oversight mechanisms that govern the relationship between the plan and reality..
Sometimes, engineering is reduced to drawing plans, but its true essence in public projects is control and oversight. What we witness today of fragility in facing weather conditions is a result of the absence of engineering as a regulatory act. When strict field oversight is missing, the technical specification becomes mere ink on paper, and the contractor becomes a party looking to maximize profit at the expense of quality in the absence of the "official eye" that ensures execution matches the design. Thus, a street collapse or tunnel flood is not a failure of engineering theories and laws, but a failure in governing execution..
The essence of the infrastructure crisis is closely linked to the accountability system in institutional performance, where achievement reflects accountability in parallel with effort exerted. When incidents of drowning and collapses pass without precisely identifying responsibilities —starting from the designer to the supervisor and the recipient— we perpetuate a culture of escaping consequences, hence the absence of effective oversight inherently means disabling the principle of reward and punishment, making the repetition of engineering errors an expected institutional behavior and not just an incidental occurrence.
Infrastructure is not just asphalt and drainage and sewage pipes; it is an investment in public value and daily citizen security. Continuing to address the outcomes such as water drainage and repairing collapses without addressing the causes represented by the lack of oversight and application of specifications is a drain on national resources. The main challenge today is not about bringing in new technologies, but about restoring the prestige of engineering oversight and enforcing the rule of specifications on the ground, away from compromises or negligence..
All of the above compels us to redefine the relationship between the state and contractors to be based on results and accountability, and not to continue bearing climate change as justification for the gaps in oversight and weak field governance; the sustainability of construction starts from the sustainability of oversight, which is a moral responsibility before it is an engineering one.
