Russia has been seeking for many years to establish a military presence in Africa.
Moscow recently revealed its deployment in 6 countries, in an expansion felt by the US military as it begins to abandon its usual rhetoric about good governance and addressing the root causes of rebellions to avoid losing further influence.
According to many Russian media outlets, Moscow now has an official military presence in 6 African countries, highlighting the growing strategy of influence on the continent, especially following the decline of the semi-military group "Wagner".
Leading the list are Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, where this spread takes various forms, including bilateral cooperation, training of local armies, protection of leaders, and exploitation of rare mineral resources.
Since the dissolution of the Wagner group and the creation of the "Africa Corp" under the Russian Ministry of Defense, Moscow has sought to coordinate these new units openly with the host governments.
This development aims to lend diplomatic legitimacy to the Russian presence and reassure African partners.
For the Kremlin, this serves as a means to counter Western influence, particularly French and American, whose forces have been forced to withdraw from several countries in the Sahel region.
The Trump administration sensed the Russian expansion in traditional areas, especially in Niger and Mali, from which American troops withdrew.
Although Africa has rarely been at the top of the Pentagon's priorities, the United States has nevertheless spent hundreds of millions of dollars on security assistance and still maintains about 6500 personnel from Africa Command on the continent.
Currently, American bases in Africa are under the supervision of "AFRICOM," the most prominent of which is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the largest and most important, in addition to bases and sites in Kenya, Somalia, and Cameroon, with varied missions including counterterrorism, military training, and information gathering, with a major focus on stabilizing the Horn of Africa and combating extremists.
In some areas, the United States faces direct competition from Russia and China. In other locations, branches of al-Qaeda and ISIS still require direct military intervention, according to US authorities.
With the upcoming closure of the American drone base in Niger and its withdrawal in late 2024, alongside previous withdrawals from Mali and other Sahel countries, the United States now faces a choice: either to strengthen relations with its remaining partners in coastal West Africa or to radically reorganize its security strategy in the Sahel region.
Observers increasingly wonder whether its recent intervention is driven by genuine strategic interests or by rhetorical stances that prioritize short-term stability while tolerating the emergence of unconstitutional political systems.
The coups in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, and Niger have weakened American and international counterterrorism efforts.
The United States now faces a tough choice: whether to prioritize combating extremism or to adhere to democratic standards when providing aid to governments that have come to power in unconstitutional ways.
According to the Russian researcher Denis Korkodinov, citing examples of countries like Burkina Faso's President Ibrahim Traore, who came to power in a military coup in September 2022, he quickly sought to rally support from a strong ally, currently represented by Moscow.
Korkodinov told "Erem News," "The cooperation between Burkina Faso and Russia is currently a priority and could solve many problems, including economic and social issues."
"Moreover, given Africa's richness in natural resources, especially energy resources, this cooperation seems very beneficial for both parties," according to the spokesperson.
"In this context, Russia expects, in exchange for military aid, not only to expand its presence in the region but also to secure new contracts for oil and gas production," he added.
