Professional unions in Jordan were established on a solid base of desire to organize professions, protect ethical and professional standards, and build a social safety net for their members. Thus, the philosophy required that these institutions be a lever for the state and society. However, a different scene has begun to form recently; where some of these entities have transformed from houses of expertise and professional organization into aging bureaucratic institutions suffering from inflated administrative expenses, which has pushed them to seek easy financing solutions by imposing fees and fines on similar activities and sectors, posing a fundamental question about the impact of this behavior on economic freedom and the general investment climate.
We clearly observe this behavior in the practices of certain unions, like the artists' union, which now imposes a fee on any artistic or entertainment activity, even if those responsible are not its members. This represents a recourse to the shortest path through legislative overreach when unions are unable to innovate in investing their assets or providing real added value to their members.
This transformation turns unions from a regulatory body to a collecting agency. The problem here is not the collection of fees per se, but the utilization of these fees to fund operational expenses for unions, some of which are suffering from inefficiency. The sustainability of the institution should not be a burden on the general economic activity, but should stem from efficient management of its resources. When the financial survival of a union takes precedence over the goal of invigorating the sector, we face an institution that hinders the growth of the field it is supposed to nurture.
This behavior evolves to take another form of distortion in other unions, like the journalists' union, where the conflict between protecting member rights and the reality of economic freedoms for media institutions (news websites) emerges. The endeavor to secure benefits restricted to a specific group by imposing legislative or financial restrictions on new market players strikes a lethal blow to the principle of equal opportunities.
In a strategic perspective, this bias creates an environment that repels individual initiatives and emerging enterprises. The small investor in the media or arts sector finds himself facing a wall of requirements and fees that do not provide professional benefit to him but go to cover the deficits of union funds that may not represent him at all. This behavior entrenches a rent-seeking professional economy, where old legislations are exploited to extort modern economic activity rather than support it.
The impact of these practices does not stop at the union's boundaries but extends to exert pressure on the Jordanian economy as a whole. Imposing high penalties and fees on cultural, media, or professional activities reduces the attractiveness of these sectors and limits their ability to generate job opportunities. Economic freedom requires smoothness in business practices, while the current union systems act as internal customs that hinder the flow of activities.
An economy seeking digital transformation and innovation cannot coexist with union legislations set in entirely different temporal contexts, where the state is no longer able to bear the cost of the institutional inefficiency practiced by these entities under the guise of financial and administrative autonomy. Exiting this impasse requires boldness in reviewing the legal frameworks governing the work of unions. The proposed philosophy here lies in transforming unions to be closer to "Professional Associations" that operate in a competitive environment, and take responsibility for funding their expenses through truly providing services and added value to their members and the market, not by imposing legislative levies on others. The amendment of laws here must aim to detach professional regulation from financial collection. Continuing to grant unions the authority to impose fines on non-members to fund their staff salaries is a structural flaw that undermines the concept of good governance and economic citizenship.
Finally, a strong state is one that protects economic activity from the encroachment of narrow group interests. The continuation of unions being hostage to a funding model that relies on hindering activities rather than stimulating them will inevitably lead to further stagnation in vital sectors. Do we possess the will to redefine "the union" as a partner in development, or will we continue to watch it transform into an administrative burden feeding on what remains of economic ambition?
