Prof. Dr. Laith Kamal Nasrawin*
The royal decree was issued to dissolve the second ordinary session of the National Assembly, after the lapse of its constitutionally defined term of six months, for the legislative authority, represented by the Senate and the House of Representatives, to enter into a recess where legislative and oversight activities on the executive authority are suspended. This milestone is an important opportunity to assess the parliamentary council's performance in terms of its legislative and oversight outputs, and the extent to which they contribute to the development of parliamentary work mechanisms, as well as their responsiveness to citizens' priorities and needs.
The House of Representatives' performance during this session continued in the same vein as in the first session, with a clear focus on legislative rather than oversight aspects. The House approved a set of laws covering various sectors, including conscription, electronic transactions, the notary, endowments, competition, and gas, reflecting some of these legislations' governmental orientation toward developing the legislative environment, particularly in the field of digital transformation, simplifying government procedures, and enhancing the efficiency of public services.
The amended social security bill occupied a large part of the council and its committees' time, within the framework of extensive discussions and consulting experts, eventually being postponed for further actuarial studies based on the recommendations of the parliamentary labor committee. Therefore, this file is not expected to be present in the agenda of the third ordinary session unless the government accelerates the necessary technical and economic studies and re-introduces it in a consensual form that takes into consideration various opinions.
The similarity between the last ordinary session that was dissolved and the first session in the field of parliamentary oversight is evident, as the House of Representatives continues to pay less attention to this role compared to legislative activity. The figures indicate that the House held a limited number of oversight sessions during this session, dedicated to posing questions and answering them, without expanding the use of more impactful oversight tools, primarily inquiries and confidence votes. Despite the presence of party representation in the council through the general electoral list, this has not clearly reflected on activating parliamentary accountability tools.
During this session, a parliamentary behavior worth noting emerged, which involved adopting parliamentary memorandums urging the government to issue decisions on matters within its constitutional jurisdiction related to the internal affairs of the state. Notably, memorandums relating to setting school holiday dates, adding days to the Eid al-Fitr holiday, or recommending appointments to leadership positions. This type of practice raises questions about the extent to which the representative understands the limits of their oversight role and their deployment of parliamentary tools to fulfill this role in a way that serves the public interest.
As for the work of parliamentary blocs and institutions, the parliamentary practice during this session has proven that the role of parliamentary groups is still in a formative stage and has not yet risen to being the fundamental basis of parliamentary work. Political parties and blocs agreed to share the seats of the permanent office, from the president, deputies, and assistants, alongside forming parliamentary committees, yet this coordination did not continue to produce unified positions or clear legislative programs, which highlighted the individual character in parliamentary work.
What reinforces the limited institutional work within the parliamentary council is that half the number of its ordinary sessions expired by the end of this session, without any actual and real amendments to its internal system. Although the council, in the context of talking about developing its work mechanisms, limited itself during this parliamentary session to forming a temporary committee from its members to consider amending the internal system, this step did not lead to any outputs or even recommendations by the end of the session, reflecting slow engagement with this important entitlement.
Ultimately, the House of Representatives now stands before what remains of its constitutional term, estimated at about two years, as an opportunity to recalibrate its performance compass. The challenge is no longer in increasing the number of approved legislations, but rather in achieving a better balance with the oversight role over the government. Moreover, developing the parliamentary work necessitates serious attention to amending the internal system, to consolidate the work of parliamentary blocs and establish clear foundations for institutional work. Only then can the council move to a more mature phase, reflecting a parliamentary role capable of legislating efficiently and overseeing responsibly within a constitutional framework based on a full parliamentary representative governance system.
* Constitutional Law Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Jordan
[email protected]
