Between Cost and Sovereignty: Does a desalinated water conveyance line between the kingdom and "Saudi Arabia" represent a viable strategic option?
In times of scarce resources, boldness may not be an option… but a necessity, as stopping water purchases from the occupied entity should not be seen as a crisis, but as an opportunity to re-engineer the Jordanian water security within a more stable Arab framework, and more aligned with sovereignty and national interest priorities.
Stopping water purchases does not mean that Jordan is without options, and at the same time, it is not necessarily that the only alternative is to pressure groundwater sources or wait for the completion of strategic projects.
While the government moves forward with the “National Carrier” project, a strategic question arises: Can Jordan establish a long-term water partnership with Saudi Arabia by creating a desalinated water conveyance line between the two countries?.
As a logical regional alternative to ending reliance on water purchases from the occupied entity, the move towards the south to Saudi Arabia is not seen as an impulsive political choice, but as a feasible strategic option.
"Saudi Arabia" possesses one of the largest desalination capacities in the world on the Red Sea, and Jordan suffers from one of the highest rates of water poverty globally, with a stable and guaranteed water demand.
This disparity opens the path to objective integration: surplus production versus chronic deficit. This opens the door to a clear formulation: a long-term production and transportation partnership, not just an annual purchase deal.
Thus, Jordan moves from being a circumstantial importer to a partner in a regional system, ensuring diversification of its sources away from any political dependency.
Most importantly, this option does not conflict with the national carrier project, but can complement it or be an interim solution until the completion of local desalination capacity, thus enhancing modern water management based on diversifying sources, not relying on a single source, no matter how important.
Assuming there is a political decision to proceed with this option, the optimal solution would not be just "buying water," but designing an integrated regional system that achieves economic feasibility and strategic sustainability, including three axes, the first of which: an independent cross-border conveyance line (not merging with Disi) starting from the nearest Saudi desalination station on the Red Sea, moving to a connection point in southern Jordan, then pumped through the national network.
Additionally, an "investment for supply" model and instead of a traditional purchase contract, adopting a Jordanian-Saudi joint investment formula in expanding an existing desalination station, allocating a specific production capacity to Jordan with a long-term contract, and fixing a pricing equation linked to the cost of energy rather than the spot market.
In this way, Jordan transforms from an "importer" to a "partner in production," reducing political and commercial risks.
The third axis would be the integration with the national carrier project, where the Saudi line serves as a complementary backup to the national desalination project, or as an interim solution until the completion of local desalination capacity.
Thus, Jordan would have a globally recognized "risk diversification" model in managing water security, and a basket of sources: local desalination, groundwater (Disi), and regional import.
If we want a quick alternative before the completion of any conveyance line project with Saudi Arabia (which could take years), the solutions need to be short-term and feasible within 6-24 months, not major infrastructure projects.
It begins with maximizing the benefit from the national desalination project, accelerating the phased execution of the desalination project linked to the Gulf of Aqaba, increasing the reuse of treated water in agriculture instead of fresh water, which provides additional quantities for drinking water, and not neglecting the reduction of water loss in the networks (historically high loss rates), stringent control of unlicensed wells, and temporary use of the groundwater reservoir.
In conclusion, establishing a conveyance line between the two countries should not be seen as merely a commercial deal, but as a regional infrastructure project that could potentially open the way for future integration of water and energy networks, especially in light of Saudi Arabia's major directions within Vision 2030. Moreover, the project could enhance the concept of "shared Arab water security," a concept that has remained theoretical for decades without practical application.
