While the corridors of “Wall Street” are busy with rapid calculations of profit and loss, and major capitals are drowning in identity conflicts, another language is being written silently in the “closed rooms” between Amman, Baghdad, and Riyadh. It's the language of energy interests, where maps are no longer drawn solely by political boundaries, but by cable routes and pipeline diameters. Today, Jordan is not standing on the sidelines of events, but is striving to be a “Connector State” in the heart of a restless region.
The electrical connection with Iraq is not just a commercial deal. It is a strategic move to enhance mutual reliance. The first phase has been completed, and work is ongoing to increase capacity to 500 megawatts by July 2025, according to statements by the general manager of the National Electric Power Company, Amjad Al-Rawashdeh. But, let's be realistic; Iraq is a “fragile” partner both security-wise and politically, and betting on it carries high risks. Jordan realizes that the stability of the neighbor is part of its own security, but it also understands that “the friend who assists you with your flaws” is a saying that acknowledges the existence of “flaws” and complexities discussed away from the public eye.
As for gas pipelines, they are distinctly political tools, yet they are “double-edged” tools. The experience of the previous Egyptian gas disruption remains in the Jordanian memory as a harsh lesson in energy security. Today, Jordan is a key player in the Eastern Mediterranean gas equation, a role that grants it influence, but also places it under the microscope of major powers and their fluctuating pressures. Being an energy corridor means that you possess a key, but you also become a vulnerable target in case the balance of power shifts. Here lies my personal view in this complicated scene: Jordan's real strength does not lie in possessing energy, but in its ability to manage the deficits of others, transforming their energy needs into long-term security and political guarantees, despite all doubts surrounding the reliability of partners.
Jordan is heavily betting on renewable energy, where its contribution has reached about 27%, with an ambition to reach 50% by 2030. This is not merely an environmental goal, but an attempt to escape from the “trap” of total reliance on the outside. International reports, including estimates from the World Bank, indicate the potential for Jordan to become a hub for green hydrogen with investments that could reach $28 billion. But the question remains: Can the exhausted Jordanian public finances bear the costs of this massive infrastructure without sinking further into debt? This is a challenge that puts the ambitious vision in confrontation with the tough financial reality.
The electrical connection with Saudi Arabia, which aims for a future 1000 megawatts, deepens this entanglement. These projects create shared interests that transcend fleeting political disagreements, but they remain hostages to major alignments. In a troubled region, the infrastructure of energy becomes the real guarantee of stability, provided it does not turn into a “pressure card” used against Jordan in moments of crisis.
Jordan does not have the luxury of waiting. In a region where maps of influence are redrawn daily, those who build the infrastructure today hold the negotiation cards tomorrow. But the real bet is not technical or financial — it is a bet on the ability of a small state to handle the threads of a large network without being swallowed by it. This is the real geopolitical test for Jordan in the coming decade.
