As mentioned in the first article of this series, the mental image of the Senate regarding the stage of approving the general budget law and the related discussions is notable.
Additionally, the mental image of the Senate is prominent in the area of the State Audit Bureau's reporting; although the report is an effective tool for the oversight role of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the discussions conducted by the House of Representatives and its committees about the report usually receive more media coverage than those conducted by the Senate and its committees.
On the other hand, the legislator has contributed to perpetuating this mental image; the legislative organization of the State Audit Bureau links the bureau to the House of Representatives rather than the Senate.
Despite the legislator mandating the President of the State Audit Bureau to present an "annual report for each fiscal year" to both the Senate and the House of Representatives, it allowed for special reports to be submitted to the House of Representatives exclusively, which are presented at any time of the year aiming to draw the House's attention to matters of urgency or importance requiring prompt consideration (Article 22 of the State Audit Bureau Law).
In addition, the appointment of the President of the bureau is made by royal decree, and the legislator has mandated the notification of this appointment to the House of Representatives, as well as obtaining the approval of the House of Representatives concerning decisions to dismiss, transfer, retire, or impose disciplinary sanctions on the President of the bureau, if the council is "not in session", such decisions are issued with the approval of His Majesty the King, and notified to the House of Representatives "upon convening" (Article 5/a of the State Audit Bureau Law).
Regarding lifting the immunity of the President of the bureau, the legislator has mandated a resolution from the House of Representatives for this (Article 5/d of the State Audit Bureau Law).
From the above, it is evident that the legislator has contributed to cementing the mental image about the Senate and made its role secondary regarding the State Audit Bureau's operations, through the legislative organization of the State Audit Bureau and how it operates, which may necessitate a reevaluation of such organization to enhance the effectiveness and oversight role of the Senate, for while the legislator has made motions of confidence to be presented before the House of Representatives, it has allowed the Senate the right to exercise other oversight tools such as questioning and interpellation (Article 96 of the Constitution).
Dr. Mohammed Rahamneh/ The University of Jordan
