Khaberni - The seventh report by the State Comptroller in Israel regarding the Gaza war revealed that the political level did not exercise its responsibility to ensure that Israel was prepared for changing security challenges based on a structured national security concept.
State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman, in a scathing supervisory report on the management in the war—emphasizing that the report does not replace a comprehensive audit that would point out failures or assign responsibility to any of the entities or officials involved in the events of October 7, 2023—said, "In such a case, the political level's ability to direct the Israeli Army and the rest of the security apparatus with a long-term strategic vision, and to challenge it and exercise control and supervision over it, is lacking and in some cases non-existent," explaining that "the goal of the report is to raise issues related to the connection between the national security concept and the events of October 7."
State Comptroller pointed out that "Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who initiated a national security concept for the State of Israel during the years 2017-2018 and worked on establishing it, did not complete what he started and did not approve an official national security concept for the State of Israel or make a binding decision on the cornerstone of implementing this concept—which is changing national priorities and allocating significant budget additions to meet security needs at the expense of other needs—despite the importance and necessity he acknowledged himself."
The State Comptroller added, "Therefore, he did not exercise his responsibility in this matter, remaining with his concept unable to be properly implemented and without binding authority."
The report also noted that the heads of the National Security Council who held their positions from 2008—the year the council's law was enacted—did not present an updated security concept for discussion and decision-making before the political-security cabinet, and thus the council did not play its role in this respect.
The report stated: "Israel is undergoing one of its toughest hours, as it is fighting a war costing many sacrifices and still faces difficult and complex challenges... The gaps in readiness and preparedness of the State of Israel to face unprecedented security challenges that threaten its sovereignty, national interests, and the security of its residents and citizens—which resulted tragically in the October 7, 2023 massacre... raise difficult questions about the long-term strategic thinking and planning processes of the Government of Israel and the political-security cabinet led by the Prime Minister."
The report also stated, "This report highlights a consistent and extended failure over the years, where the political level across generations did not exercise its responsibility to ensure that the State of Israel is prepared for changing security challenges based on an organized, updated, and officially approved national security concept. Thus, the Governments of Israel, led by Prime Ministers over the years, have never approved an official national security concept, contrary to what is customary in Western countries." This is the seventh report issued on the "Iron Swords" (Gaza war).
For example, the State Comptroller pointed out that the Israeli Army, for years, altered the scale of its tank array's force without direction from the political level with a long-term strategic vision derived from an organized and officially approved national security concept. It was mentioned in the report that in 2020, "the Israeli Army, under the command of then-Chief of Staff, Reserve General Aviv Kochavi, implemented a program to determine the size of the tank array, without then-Defense Minister Naftali Bennett presenting the program beforehand to the political-security cabinet for reviewing its necessity, and this was not in line with the summary of the discussion with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from January 2020."
Englman also warned that as of the completion of the audit, Israel still does not possess an officially approved national security concept with binding authority.
The State Comptroller also noted that the "events of October 7 and their fateful impacts necessitate a review, among other things, of the unofficial national security concept that has taken root in the State of Israel, the political handling of the national security concept for the State of Israel, and the need to formulate and approve an organized and official national security concept."
The report's authors also observed that the surprise attack on Israel by "Hamas" on October 7, 2023 highlighted "the collapse of three fundamental principles in one moment: deterrence, warning, and defense, which are three of the four basic principles upon which the unofficial national security concept entrenched in Israel is based."
They clarified that "the extent of the application of the fourth principle — the principle of decisiveness, which is the focus of the Iron Swords War, has not yet been clarified as of the date of completing the audit."
The authors of the report concluded that Hamas launched an unprecedented attack on Israel, thereby debunking the prevailing assumption among the Israeli Army and political level, which they presented in discussions of the political-security cabinet just months before the attack and in the media in the years leading up to the attack, that the "Hamas" movement was deterred from confronting Israel.
The report also highlighted that the intelligence agencies did not provide a warning about the attack, and Israel was surprised by the attack. This, despite the fact that Israel is a regional military and technological power with advanced intelligence capabilities and strong intelligence agencies.
