Khaberni - Yedioth Ahronoth political analyst Nadav Eyal discussed the genocide Israel is waging on Gaza and stated that no forthcoming agreement between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Israel will lead to the disappearance of the movement from the Strip.
The analyst, in an extensive article, considered the war on Gaza "the biggest challenge in the history of the Israeli army," according to the words of a senior leader of the General Staff of the Israeli army, stating that completely eliminating Hamas was never originally a goal for the Israeli government or the security establishment.
Eyal stated that the ongoing agreement being discussed is seen by many in Israel as a political and security achievement, but it does not achieve what Benjamin Netanyahu's government promoted at the start of the war as "removal of Hamas rule", clarifying that what could be accomplished militarily has indeed been achieved, but the movement "will not disappear".
The political analyst emphasizes that the destruction of Hamas's military and administrative capabilities has indeed been achieved according to Israeli estimates, but destroying it is an unrealistic goal because it is a "populist movement rooted in the Palestinian society, and it cannot be dismantled as an organization except in one case, and even this is not guaranteed".
He adds that this case would involve a comprehensive and prolonged military occupation of the Strip enforcing complete Israeli control, including civil and security administration. However, he asserts that even with this case, it is doubtful that Israel would succeed in achieving that, clarifying that this option "was never really on the table, as neither the government nor the army declared an intention to occupy Gaza or completely eradicate Hamas".
Indeed, he points out that Netanyahu and leaders in the security establishment rejected the idea of direct military administration and did not provide any political vision for after the war.
The difficulties in Gaza
Eyal sheds light on the difficulties faced by the occupation army in the Gaza Strip, where there are "hostages held, underground battles in a complex tunnel network, and a high civilian population density preventing maneuvering, and massive international pressure to limit human casualties".
He adds that full occupation of Gaza City would not have resolved the war even from the army's own perspective because military control does not mean eliminating the resistance.
He explains that any military advancement would subsequently require "cleansing" the central areas then the south, which exceeds the timeframe allowed by the Americans to end the war by the end of the year, while Israel had no civilian plan for managing the Strip or dealing with its inhabitants after Hamas's withdrawal.
The political analyst describes the agreement being formulated as an accomplishment for Israel in that it forces Hamas in its first phase to give up its most important cards: the hostages. However, in the second phase, Israel transitions to a gradual withdrawal from the Strip, while Hamas does not officially return to power, but the Israeli army will also not remain.
According to the proposed formula, the administration in Gaza would be Palestinian, with potential participation from security forces from Arab or regional countries. Eyal considers the presence of these forces as effectively restricting the Israeli army's freedom of movement in the Strip.
However, he reports from a senior Israeli official saying that it is impossible to impose the disarmament of light weapons in Gaza under such circumstances, although Trump's plan explicitly prescribes laying down arms.
Fears of Hamas returning to power
The political analyst notes that the discussions within the security cabinet over more than a year concluded only three options for Gaza after the war: either Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (Fatah movement), or direct Israeli occupation. However, Israel—as he says—did not choose any of these alternatives and preferred to maintain "the vacuum", which might allow Hamas to retain its indirect influence in managing the Strip.
In the best case, he expects the Palestinian Authority would take on a formal administration supported internationally, with oversight from a regional force limiting Hamas's military capabilities. In the worst scenarios, the administration would be in the hands of "local employees doing what Hamas wants behind the curtain", he describes.
Eyal raises the central question of how to ensure that Hamas does not return to control the Strip? He answers that this can only be achieved through political smartness and enduring patience, in addition to a constant readiness to use military force again when necessary, as is the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
He warns that "as long as there are Palestinians in Gaza, Hamas will remain in existence until the Palestinians themselves decide otherwise", pointing out that confronting the movement will be long and cannot be resolved by a single military operation.
According to Eyal, the majority of Israelis support the Trump agreement to end the war in exchange for the return of the hostages.
In a survey published by Channel 13, more than 70% of Israelis said they support the plan, while another survey showed that 74% support ending the war in exchange for the return of hostages, including a majority from the ruling coalition itself.
He comments on this by saying, "Successful wars need wide public consensus", pointing out that the Israeli public is tired of the prolonged war and wants the hostages back, but this does not mean giving up the principle of not allowing Hamas to return or grow again.
The political analyst concludes that everything could collapse at any moment, as there is still doubt that Hamas will actually agree to release all the hostages in the first phase of the agreement.
He says that Hamas and Israel are trying to convince Trump and the world that the negotiations did not fail because of them, pointing out that the deal and Trump's plan "do not consider Hamas part of Gaza's future", but at the same time do not end the conflict with them, and he goes on to say that the confrontation with Hamas will continue for many years even after any agreement is implemented.
